Was Hitler
Only an Irredentist?
By Eric
V. Snow
Did Hitler really want to
conquer the world? Or would he have
been content just taking over areas for Germany that were already populated by
Germans (a foreign policy of irredentism)?
Let's analyze Pat Buchanan’s view of the Munich agreement in 1938,
especially in light of the facts he leaves out that contradict his historical
analysis. (For his full development of
this thesis, see his book “Churchill, Hitler, and “The Unnecessary War”: How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West
Lost the World.”) Even someone
having little more than the facts and primary sources in William L.
Shirer's "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich” and some detailed
knowledge of WWI, can find all sorts of problems with Buchanan's revisionist
history. Because his arguments resemble some of what the British historian AJP Taylor argued years
ago (in 1961’s “The Origins of World War II”) and other revisionist historians,
Buchanan’s thesis isn’t novel when it says that America and Britain should have
just stood aside and let Nazi Germany go after Soviet Russia and let the
totalitarian dictatorships mutually exhaust one another. Based on often secret documents written and
statements made before World War II began, this essay will argue that Hitler’s
foreign policy aimed to conquer large areas without Germans already living
there.
First of all, the reason why
the Allies at Versailles didn’t follow the principle of self-determination
about Czechoslovakia’s borders was a result of another concern: Suppose
the Germans went on the march again, and sought revenge for their defeat in
WWI. After all, after their similar
humiliation in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the
French had wanted revenge after they lost the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine
to Germany. So the Allies prudently decided that Czechoslovakia should be
given a defensible border, which was the pre-1914 border between Germany and Austria-Hungary.
To cede all the mountainous border areas with Germans to Germany would have
made Czechoslovakia nearly as vulnerable as Poland later was to the German
Wehrmacht (army). The Allies’ diplomats had to choose among conflicting
goals, and when political goals conflict, sometimes it's best on a
practical basis to follow one principle rather than another. In this
case, making it possible for Czechoslovakia to defend itself against renewed
German aggression was more important than the principle of ethnic
self-determination for every ethnic group within its borders. As the
history of 1938 and the crisis preceding the Munich agreement showed, their
concern was well founded!
Should Self-Determination Always Be the Ultimate Political Value?
After all, self-determination
shouldn’t always be the ultimate political value from a philosophical
viewpoint: Anyone who thinks the Ottoman and/or Austrian-Hungarian
Empires should have been preserved has to reject Buchanan's complaint about the
1919 Treaty of Versailles turning Czechoslovakia into a multiethnic
country. Self-determination isn’t always a benefit to the
ruled: Where would have average Chinese
have preferred to live in 1972?
Colonial British Hong Kong? Or
Mao's Red China during the Cultural Revolution? The Chinese refugees who fled Chairman Mao’s totalitarian state
in order to live under British colonialist rule answer that question by the way
they voted with their feet. Since
Communism was normally worse than colonialism for average people, self-determination
doesn’t necessarily promote “the greatest good for the greatest number” when an
independent state crushes more economic, religious, and political freedoms than
a non-independent one does.
Germany Would Have Been Much Easier to Defeat in 1938 than in 1939
Buchanan claims that the
Allies would have had a harder time of beating Hitler in 1938 in Czechoslovakia
than they did in 1939 in Poland, but this is utterly false. The
one-year delay in going to war hurt the (future) Allies far more than
the Axis powers. First of all, although Britain could have
only have landed 2 divisions on the Continent then (Buchanan isn't
quite right to say none), Czechoslovakia had 35 well armed, well trained
divisions that would have been well ensconced in their mountain
fortresses. Furthermore, France could have mobilized 100 divisions
against the weak available western German forces of 5 fighting divisions and 7
reserve divisions in a line of fortifications that was still under
construction. On top of this, Czechoslovakia had a secondary guarantee of
protection from the Soviet Union. Had France and Czechoslovakia
had gone to war with Germany, the USSR may well have joined them in
order to have it out with their fascist/Nazi ideological arch foes as
well.
After World War II, during
the Nuremberg war crime trials, top German generals were put on the witness
stand and they explained their view of the would-be 1938 military order of
battle. General Keitel, chief of the OKW (German High Command of the
Army), then commented: "We were extraordinarily happy that it had
not come to a military operation because . . . we had always been of the
opinion that our means of attack against the frontier fortifications of
Czechoslovakia were insufficient. From a purely military point of view we
lacked the means for an attack which involved the piercing of the frontier
fortifications." (Shirer, p. 423). We now know, much unlike
the case for Poland a year later, the German army would have had a much harder
time of conquering Czechoslovakia. Field Marshal von Manstein, one of the
most brilliant German generals during WWII, commented: "If a war had
broken out, neither our western border nor our Polish frontier could really
have been effectively defended by us, and there is no doubt whatsoever that had
Czechoslovakia defended herself, we would have been held up by her
fortifications, for we did not have the means to break through."
Jodl, the "brains" of the OKW, testified about the imbalance in
forces noted already above, that about 100 French divisions would have
been thrown up against 12 German without the protection from
completed fortifications. (In 1940, the French actually had more tanks
than the Germans. A French attack against Germany's 1938 border
wouldn't have failed like it did in 1914). Later on, Hitler himself
toured the Czech fortress line, and candidly told Dr. Carl Burckhardt, the
League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig, "When after Munich we were
in a position to examine Czechoslovak military strength from within, what we
saw of it greatly disturbed us; we had run a serious danger. The plan
prepared by the Czech generals was formidable. I now understand why my
generals urged restraint." (Shirer, p. 424).
Furthermore, we now know how
weak the Luftwaffe's (German air force's) strength was: It was in
absolutely no position to bomb effectively London or Paris (as was feared
then), since it would have been bogged down while performing tactical
support for the Wehrmacht on the frontiers. As Shirer (p. 425)
comments: "The German Air Force, like the Army, was concentrated
against Czechoslovakia and therefore, like the Army, was incapable of serious
action in the West. Even if a few German bombers could have been spared
to attack London and Paris it is highly doubt that they would have reached
their targets. Weak as the British and French fighter defenses were, the
Germans could not have given their bombers fighter protection, if they had had
the plans. Their fighter bases were too far away."
Therefore, Britain didn't
need a lot of Spitfires when all these other military factors would have
been far more in the (would be) Allies favor than they were a year later when
Poland's turn came. Germany herself was still rearming, which is why the
French and Czechs alone (without the Soviets), would have outnumbered
the Germans more than two to one in 1938. Hitler could have
been stopped with far, far fewer people killed had the inevitable war come in
1938 over Czechoslovakia than as it did over Poland in 1939. That's
why Chamberlain's diplomatic calculations were so tragically foolish when
seen in retrospect. Buchanan is totally, absolutely wrong to say the
British Empire would have committed suicide by going to war in 1938 over
Czechoslovakia, as the post-war testimony of German generals
decisively proves. Chamberlain was totally mistaken
when told the Czech President Benes via telegram
that Germany would quickly overrun his country. Chamberlain also
erroneously snubbed Stalin by not letting the Soviets participate in the
Munich conference despite his country had a signed treaty for a defensive
alliance with Czechoslovakia. That act of disrespect was one reason why
Stalin made his deal with Hitler that started the war, besides the obvious
weakness France and Britain had shown during the 1938 crisis, which showed they
weren't reliable as allies. Furthermore, when France unilaterally
abrogated its treaty with Czechoslovakia, it badly undermined its other
alliances with Eastern European countries, since they saw that France's word
was worth little. After Munich, France’s national credibility
was badly damaged. Building on the blow already inflicted on
France’s credibility during the reoccupation of the Rhineland, Munich made
these Eastern European nations consider what kind of deals they should make
with the Fuhrer instead.
Hitler Could Have Been Disposed of in 1936 With Almost No Loss of Life
Of course, Hitler could have
been much more easily disposed of with nearly no loss of life had the French
resisted the military reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, which violated the
Locarno treaty. At Nuremberg, Jodl testified how easily the French
Army could have won: "Considering the situation we were in, the
French covering army could have blown us to pieces." Shirer then
comments (p. 293): "It [the French army] could have--and had it,
that almost certainly would have been the end of Hitler, after which history
might have taken quite a different and brighter turn than it did, for the dictator
could never have survived such a fiasco. Hitler himself admitted as
much. 'A retreat on our part,' he conceded later, 'would have spelled
collapse.'" Paul Schmidt, Hitler's interpreter, was told by
Hitler: "The forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland
were the most nerve-racking in my life. If the French had then marched
into the Rhineland, we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our
legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly
inadequate for even a moderate resistance." After all, Germans
had only sent across a mere 3 battalions into the Rhineland, while the French
high command's decision to (casually) move 13 divisions into position
nearby frightened the German High Command. So no general French
mobilization would have been necessary to have disposed of Hitler at this
point, unlike the case for Czechoslovakia 2 years later. Since the Treaty of Versailles had limited
the Germany army to 100,000 men, the Nazis had to rebuild Germany from its
relatively low level of military capability. In a giant diplomatic game
of "chicken," Hitler gambled, betting that the French would back down
and not intervene. Hitler had judged his opponents well: The bully
won because his opponents were too afraid to take him on despite they had
superior armed forces at their command. Because of France's national
credibility was severely weakened by not responding to Hitler's move to
remilitarize its border area with France, its foreign alliances to the east
began to fray.
Should We Believe Hitler Didn’t Want Additional Land outside of Poland?
Buchanan's claim that
Hitler did not want war with Poland absurdly believes Hitler was telling
the truth. For example, before the Rhineland reoccupation (in
1936) and the repudiation of Locarno, Hitler said in a major public
speech: "We have no territorial demands to make in Europe! . . .
Germany will never break the peace!" Obviously, this was false, when
in a few years he made territorial demands of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland. For the meeting with Chamberlain, Hitler's translator wrote
down in this notes a summary of Hitler's comments (my emphasis):
"As he had already stated several times, the Czech problem was
the last territorial demand which he had to make in Europe."
Well, if that was true, why did he want Danzig a year later? Given
this track record, are we foolish enough at this point in world history to
believe Hitler wasn't lying a year later when saying the same thing about
Poland? Hitler repeatedly during the 1930's gave speeches and
interviews proclaiming his love of peace. Furthermore, since the Nazi
archives are fully available, why should we believe such
propaganda? For example, according to captured German foreign office
documents (Shirer, p. 387), Hitler, in advance of taking the
Sudetenland, stirred up Hungary and Poland to get in their part of
Czechoslovakia, as well as encouraging unrest among the Slovaks. Buchanan
writes as if the collapse and the German annexation of most of the rest of
Czechoslovakia (besides the Sudetenland) would have happened
without Germany’s helping create this outcome in advance. Well, Hitler told the Hungarians he had no
intention of letting even a rump Czechoslovakia to exist. According to a
German Foreign office memorandum's summary, Hitler said: "It was
Hungary's last opportunity to join in. If she did not, he would not be in
a position to put in a word for Hungarian interests. In his opinion, the
best thing would be to destroy Czechoslovakia." (Shirer, p. 388).
Hitler's real geopolitical
goals are much better revealed by secret government documents than in his major
public speeches that were aimed squarely at foreign opinion. Furthermore, what did Hitler say his goals
were at other places and times?
Consider carefully what his political objectives were according to
"Mein Kampf," much of which was written while he was in jail
after his failed Beer Hall Putsch in Munich, Bavaria in 1923. In this
combination autobiography and political tract, he declared his goal was to gain
lebensraum (“living room”) for the German people in the east, which meant they
needed to occupy Russian land. Obviously, to do that, he would have to
take Poland as well. After all, from his racist viewpoint, the Slavs were
an inferior ethnic group, fit only for manual and/or slave labor: It was
morally right to ethnically cleanse them from their land in order to make room
for the racially superior Aryan Germans.
Let's consider now various
secret documents and private conversations in which Hitler declared
that his goals were to conquer Poland, attack France, Russia,
etc. To believe Hitler's last demand for territory was going to
be for a slice of Poland is simply absurd when all these records
of his real goals are now available for inspection by historians and
others. During the negotiations that led to the Rome-Berlin Axis
alliance between Italy and Germany, Hitler told the
Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano (quoting Shirer, p. 298):
"Mussolini, Hitler declared, was 'the leading statesman in the world, to
whom none may even remotely compare himself.' Together, Italy and Germany
could conquer not only 'Bolshevism' but the West. Including
England! The British, Hitler thought, might eventually seek an
accommodation with a united Italy and Germany. If not, the two powers,
acting together, could easily dispose of her. 'German and Italian
rearmament,' Hitler reminded Ciano, 'is proceeding much more rapidly
than rearmament can in England . . . In three years Germany will be ready
. . .' The date is interesting. Three years hence would be the fall
of 1939."
In late 1937 during a small
meeting, Hitler told his geopolitical goals to the very top
leaders of the German armed forces (as found in Shirer, p. 305):
"He [Hitler] explained that he regarded the remarks he was about to
make as of such importance that, in the event of his death, they should be
regarded as his last will and testament. 'The aim of Germany policy,'
he said, 'was to make secure and to preserve the racial community and to
enlarge it. It was therefore a question of space [Lebensraum].' The
Germans, he laid it down, had 'the right to a greater living space than other
peoples . . . Germany's future was therefore wholly conditional upon solving
the need for space.' Where? Not in some far-off African or Asian
colonies, but in the heart of Europe 'in immediate proximity to the
Reich.' The question for Germany was, Where could she achieve the
greatest gain at the lowest cost? [The record of Hitler's words
follow] The history of all ages--the Roman Empire and the British
Empire--had proved that expansion could only be carried out by breaking down
resistance and taking risks; setbacks were inevitable. There had never .
. . been spaces without a master, and there were none today; the attacker
always comes up against a possessor.
[Back to Shirer's summary that sometimes quotes Hitler directly.] Two ‘hate-inspired’ countries, Hitler
declared, stood in Germany’s way: Britain
and France. Both countries were opposed
to ‘any further strengthening of Germany’s position.’ . . . Nonetheless, Britain, France and Russia must
be considered as [quoting Hitler] 'power factors in our political
calculations.' Therefore: [Quoting the record of Hitler's words, my
emphasis] Germany's problem could be solved only by means of force, and this
was never without attendant risk.
Shirer
then continues to quote Hitler’s own words in analyzing the time and location
to start the next war: “If one accepts
as the basis of the following exposition the resort to force, with its
attendant risks, then there remain to be answered the questions
"when" and "where." There were three cases to be
dealt with. Case I: Period 1943-45: After
this date, only a change for the worse, from our point of view, could be
expected. The equipment of the Army, Navy and Airforce . . . . was nearly
completed. . . . Our relative strength would decrease in relation to the
rearmament . . . by the rest of the world [my emphasis. If the "world" is who may resist
Germany, Hitler wasn't just aiming to reacquire irredentist slices of
German populated lands ruled by non-German nations!] . . . Besides, the world
was expecting our attack and was increasing its countermeasures from year to
year. It was while the rest of the world was increasing its defenses that
we were obliged to take the offensive. . . . If the Fuehrer was still living,
it was unalterable resolve to solve Germany's problem of space at the latest by
1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 would arise in Cases II
and III. Case II If internal strife in France should
develop into such a domestic crisis as to absorb the French Army completely and
render it incapable of use for war against Germany, then the time for action
against the Czechs had come. Case III If France is so
embroiled by a war with another state that she cannot 'proceed' against Germany
. . . [then] Our first objective . . . must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and
Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat to our flank in any
possible operation against the West . . . If the Czechs were overthrown
and a common German-Hungary frontier achieved [i.e., Hitler wasn't planning to
stop and be satisfied with only the areas occupied by Germans in
Czechoslovakia], a neutral attitude on the part of Poland could be more
certainly counted upon in the event of a Franco-German conflict.
Now
then Shirer summarizes Hitler’s plans again:
“But what would France, Britain, Italy, and Russia do? Hitler went
into the answer to that question in considerable detail. . . . Hitler then
outlined some of the advantages of the 'annexation of Czechoslovakia and
Austria': better strategic borders for Germany, freeing of military
forces 'for other purposes,' acquisition of some twelve million 'Germans,'
additional foodstuffs for five to six million Germans in the Reich, and
manpower for twelve new Army divisions.”
Now Shirer goes back to quoting Hitler directly: “The time for our attack on the Czechs and
Austria must be made dependent on the course of the [hypothetical]
Anglo-French-Italian war . . . This favorable situation . . . would not occur
again . . . The descent [attack] upon the Czechs would have to be carried out
with 'lightning speed.'” Shirer then
analyzes Hitler’s secret plans to begin war in a few years: “ Thus as evening darkened Berlin on that
autumn day of November 5, 1937--the meeting broke up at eight-fifteeen--the die
was cast. Hitler had communicated his irrevocable decision to go to
war. To the handful of men who would have to direct it there could no
longer be any doubt. The dictator had said it all ten years before in Mein
Kampf, had said Germany must have Lebensraum in the East and must
be prepared to use force to obtain it" (pp. 307-308). Two of the
generals present and his foreign minister questioned Hitler plans during this
meeting, saying Germany wasn't yet ready for a big war and that to
provoke a war now would risk disaster. They were soon sacked
for their opposition. Notice, by the way, what Hitler said in "Mein
Kampf" was to be put into practical action: Words have meanings,
ideas have consequences, people who proclaim their aggressive goals in
advance should not be discounted a priori if they (later or presently) have
the power to do it.
Hitler’s Plans to Expand Eastwards Far Exceeded reclaiming Danzing for Germany
On May 23, 1939, Hitler had
another meeting with his top leaders of the armed services, which reveal his
foreign policy wasn't merely about uniting German-populated territories
(or irredentism) with Germany, but was much broader in scope. Hitler told
his top generals and admirals (Shirer, p. 484+): "Germany's
economic problems, he began, could only be solved by obtaining more Lebensraum
in Europe, and [directly quoting Hitler] 'this is impossible without invading
other countries or attacking other people's possessions. . . . Further
successes can no longer be attained without the shedding of blood . . . Danzing
is not the subject of the dispute at all. [My emphasis. Buchanan mistakenly thinks it was!
Hitler privately said otherwise!] It is a question of expanding our
living space in the East, of securing our food supplies and also of solving the
problem of the Baltic States. . . . There is no other possibility
in Europe . . . If fate forces us into a showdown with the West it is
invaluable to possess a large area in the East. In wartime we shall be
even less able to rely on record harvests than in peacetime." Hitler
also said on the same occasion: "There is no question of sparing
Poland and we are left with the decision: to attack Poland at the first
suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech
affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. Success
in isolating her will be decisive." Buchanan falsely says Hitler
didn't want war with Poland. What rubbish! On the possibilities of
Russian intervention in Poland, Hitler commented: "It is not ruled
out that Russia might disinterest herself in the destruction of
Poland." But if the USSR did ally with the two Western powers, that
'would lead me to attack England and France with a few devastating blows.' . .
. 'The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with
England. It is necessary to be prepared for the showdown. England
see in our development the establishment of a hegemony which would weaken
England. [Hitler here shows he is well aware of England's traditional
military/diplomatic role as a balancer in European affairs, that England naturally
opposes any one nation gaining dominant control of the European
continent.] . . . The Dutch and Belgian air bases [Hitler says] must be
militarily occupied. Declarations of neutrality can be ignored. If
England wants to intervene in the Polish war, we must make a lightning
attack on Holland. We must aim at establishing a new line of defense on
Dutch territory as far as the Zuyder Zee. The war with England and France
will be a war of life and death. The idea that we can get off cheaply is
dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must then burn our boats and it
will no longer be a question of right or wrong but of to be or not to be for
eighty million people [i.e., Germany]. . . . The aim [Hitler said] must be to
deal the enemy a smashing or a finally decisive blow right at the start.
Considerations of right or wrong, or of treaties, do not enter into the
matter. This will be possible only when we do not 'slide' into a war with
England on account of Poland. . . . If we succeed in occupying and securing
Holland and Belgium, as well as defeating France, the basis for a successful
war against England has been created. The Luftwaffe can then closely
blockade England from western France and the fleet undertake the wider blockade
with submarines. . . . 'The aim,' Hitler concluded, [Shirer comments here]
apparently forgetting all about Poland for the moment, 'will always be to force
England to her knees.'" Again,
if Hitler's geopolitical goals were merely one of irredentism,
of uniting German minorities in neighboring countries with the Reich, there
would be no need to be invade the Low countries, let alone plan to fight an all
out war with Britain.
In “Mein Kampf,” Hitler Proclaimed that Germany Should Attack Russia
Shirer, in words he
broadcasted in 1939, predicted Germany would go to war with Russia based
on what Hitler had said his goals were in "Mein Kampf."
Although the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact put off that
fateful conflict by nearly two years after they carved up Poland
between each other in 1939, their showdown still came about
nevertheless. Do we ever take the words of authoritarian or totalitarian
bullies seriously when they have power to implement their goals? Or
do we blow them off, like Chamberlain did, and Buchanan wants to do now?
For example, if the Iranian president says he wants to wipe Israel
off the map, and is presently building the machinery and
infrastructure to make nukes, do we think he's just kidding? If
so, why?
William Shirer
said, in his “CBS Broadcast” from New York (14th July, 1939): "There is one reason which would seem
to rule out the possibility of an alignment between German and Soviet Russia.
It's this: Hitler's goal is the occupation and annexation of a vast part of
Russia. How are you going to play ball with a man who covets your house and
intends to settle in it if he can, even if he has to hit you over the head with
his bat? And moreover says so.
“Because he does in Mein Kampf, that Nazi
bible which we all have to go to to divine what the Fuhrer may have in his mind
next. Hitler in Mein Kampf says very plainly that Germany will only be a
great nation when it acquires a much larger territory in Europe. From where is
that territory to come? Hitler very obligingly gives us the answer. It is: From
Russia.
“A second reason is that if Hitler were to make a
deal with Russia, the Japanese alliance, or whatever you call their present
understanding, falls through automatically. Now the strange tie-up between
Japan and Germany is not so strange as it seems, if we look into it for a
moment. It's - valuable to Germany first as a part of a general threat to
Britain and France - and to a lesser extent, the U.S. - in the East. Secondly, if
and when Russia is to be conquered, it confronts Russia with a war on two
greatly distant fronts, thus making Germany's job of conquering European Russia
much easier. This second point is also the reason for Tokyo's friendship with
Berlin - that is, if Japan is to get the Russian maritime provinces as well as
Mongolia and a big slice of Siberia, Germany's military effort on the Western
Front is absolutely necessary. Unless Japan ruins itself as a Great Power in
China, and thus can no longer threaten the three Democracies in the Far East,
there is little evidence that Hitler will ditch Tokyo. Along the path that he
has apparently chosen, it is too valuable an ally."
From a Non-pacifist Perspective, Why Non-interventionism Is a Foolish Policy When Facing Aggressive Hegemonic Threats
Now, let's turn philosophical.
Here I'm analyzing this from a worldly perspective (not a strict
pacifist one, that condemns all wars fought for any reason because of what
Jesus said in the Sermon on the Mount). So what's the foundational flaw
in Buchanan's historical reasoning? Much like the leftists and liberals
who discounted the Communist threat in the past, and the threat of radical
Islam today, Buchanan discounts the Nazi threat in the past in order to prop up
a non-interventionist foreign policy.
(Non-interventionists also commonly justify their position by
discounting, whitewashing, rationalizing, excusing, “explaining,” and/or
otherwise justifying the atrocities of the Nazis, Communists, and/or
conservative Islam). But when there's a serious hegemonic threat, a force
that really could conquer and/or convert the world to a hostile ideology
under totalitarian or authoritarian government(s), isolationism and
non-interventionism are criminally foolish policies. Collective security
and "peace through strength" by standing up the bullies is the
correct (worldly) response to hegemonic threats. The British Empire and
America have faced down three major hegemonic threats in the past
century: Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Communism.
Regardless of what other sins can be charged to their account historically,
this grand achievement greatly outbalances all the other general foreign
policy sins of the “Anglo-Saxon Powers.” It’s unbelievable blindness to
think that by burying our heads in the sand will make such aggressive threats
will go away on their own. If your neighbor says he's going to
kill you, and has lots of guns and ammo, should you pretend that he's no
threat, that no counter-measures like informing the police should be
undertaken? Fundamentally, the error in Libertarian
isolationist/Liberal-Leftist foreign policy is a naive, optimistic view of
human nature as being good. They don't think authoritarians and
totalitarians really mean what they say, that they are never intrinsically
aggressive on their own account, but are merely responding defensively to prior
or current “provocations” of other nations.
The Wall Journal opinion writer Bret Stephens comments about this kind
of naivety: "George Orwell once observed that pacifism is a doctrine
that can only be preached behind the protective cover of the Royal Navy.
Similarly, libertarianism can only be seriously espoused under the protective
cover of Leviathan." That is, the only reason why libertarians even
have their freedom to complain about interventionist foreign policy publicly is
because American (and British) interventions abroad against hegemonic threats
gave them their political freedom that would rob them of their
freedom.
Although he's a good Catholic, Pat Buchanan, the
isolationist American Firster, at some level discounts the evil human nature of
America’s past and present foreign enemies, that bullies shouldn't be taken at
their word when they make threats before taking action. He refuses to accept
that one of the great tragedies of the interwar period was America's
isolationist foreign policy. He may well be letting the traditional
Irish-American animus against Britain for all its mistreatment of Ireland over
the centuries cause him to look upon Germany favorably. He also has
flirted with arguments derived from Holocaust deniers, which
makes his attempt to whitewash Hitler's motives even more suspicious. For
example, he once argued that the gas chamber at Treblinka couldn't have killed
all the people attributed to it because its diesel engines wouldn't
produce enough carbon monoxide. He also once referred
to "so-called Holocaust Survivor Syndrome," which involved
"group fantasies of martyrdom and heroics." But of course,
anyone who survived "the theory and practice of hell" in the
concentration camps had awful emotional and psychological traumas, similar
to what combat veterans suffer from after they return home from war.
The charges of anti-Semitism that have been flung up against him are not
by any means a priori implausible. (Years ago, I read his defenders on
this score, and then saw the rebuttal by someone charging him with
anti-Semitism in “American Spectator”:
The rebuttal was unexpectedly plausible, I had to admit). So then,
should we be learning positive things about Hitler's goals and recent
German history from such a source without subjecting it to withering scrutiny
for what's distorted or left out? Here above, a big hole was punched in
Buchanan's arguments about Munich mostly using Shirer's work.
(Has Buchanan read Shirer? He shouldn't pretend he doesn't exist
when writing about this period. Suppose I disagreed with Shirer
as a historical writer. If I did, I would start by showing how he's
wrong using the primary sources from the diplomatic archives, not by throwing
out arguments that can be easily turned into mincemeat by
someone familiar with Shirer, as done here). Suppose
a professional historian, an expert on the 20th century diplomatic
and military history of Germany and who can read Nazi Germany's archives first
hand, scrutinized Buchanan's book and wrote up his critique.
(Rather than a talented writer, but an apparent non-historian, such as
Christopher Hitchens in “Newsweek” review of Buchanan’s book). Such a
historian probably could tear Buchanan's analysis of the 1930's diplomatic
history of Europe into shreds.
How Should We Think about Hypothetical “What-If” Scenarios in History?
When analyzing and thinking about
Buchanan's arguments, it should be noted much of this debate depends on
where one draws the line in setting up various hypothetical, "what
if" versions of history. How much "real"
history should be allowed to elapse (blunders and all) before
someone decides to set up various hypothetical scenarios to "fix"
things compared to the actual historical outcomes?
It’s unlikely that there’s anything new
in Buchanan's criticisms of the Versailles Treaty as a leading cause for World War II, since that's about as original a
historical insight as it would be for Ford to start making Model T's
again. The French Field Marshal, Ferdinand Foch, said as the treaty
was being signed: "This is not peace. It is an armistice for 20
years." Of course, his reasoning for saying this was the opposite of
how it could be interpreted today: Foch advocated a very harsh peace that
would have stripped Germany of the Rhineland, and
would have allowed France to permanently occupy it as protection against a
future German attack. Wilson and Lloyd George wisely opposed this demand,
so it didn't happen. In retrospect, of course, had the War Guilt
clause been omitted, and the load of reparations greatly
lessened, average Germans would have been much less resentful of the
Allies and would have had much less desire to vote for politicians who wanted
diplomatic and military revenge. (However, it should be noted the War
Guilt clause is more defensible historically Germans then would have admitted
then: That is, recent historiography would make this statement
defensible: "Germany and Austria-Hungary
were three-quarters to blame for War War I, when considering both the
weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1914 and the years of
military build-up and diplomatic bluster in the preceding
generation." Although not written by a professional historian,
"Dreadnought" does an excellent job citing and
analyzing the details that would justify this generalization. If
someone disagrees, the objector should carefully quote from this book’s cited
primary sources and then state specifically what is wrong
with Massie's analysis while citing primary source documents in
response. A
priori, any broad, off-the-top of one's head generalizations should
be ruled out of court). The world economic system also would have
been more stable had Germany been relieved of the load of
reparations earlier than it was, and the Great Depression wouldn't have
been as bad as it became. America basically lent money to Germany to pay
France, which wasn't a sustainable economic dynamic. Of course, the diplomatic achievements of
Stresemann and Bruning during the Weimar republic (before Hitler became
chancellor) loosened much of the shackles of Versailles, including concerning
reparations, with the Allies' consent.
How Early “Could-Have-Been” Interventions Could Have Prevented Most of World War II’s Deaths
So then, suppose we accept the
Versailles treaty (real history, blunders and all), but then fast forward to
the 1930's, and start cranking out historical hypotheticals. Had
France stood up to Hitler at the Rhineland in 1936, Hitler could well have
lost power without even any shedding of blood or a general mobilization by
France. Or, there's the what-if Shirer expertly summarizes
concerning Czechoslovakia in 1938 (p. 426): "Germany was in no
position to go to war on October 1, 1938,
against Czechoslovakia and France and Britain, not to mention Russia. Had she done so,
she would have been quickly and easily defeated, and that would have been the
end of Hitler and the Third Reich." I maintain either of these
hypothetical scenarios is much, much better than the one that presumably
follows Buchanan, under which the Nazis would have duked it out with the
Soviets and have exhausted each other. Under my two scenarios, 27 million
Russians, 6 million Jews, 6 million Poles (counting 2 million Jews again), and
7 million Germans are saved from death. My abhorrence of Soviet Communism
wouldn’t make me want to look upon favorably upon the would-be collective
sufferings of average people when these totalitarian dictatorships would
clash. During the TV coverage of the millennial celebrations on the eve
of 1999 going into 2000, I remember seeing all the people gathered in Red
Square. I then thought about how
truly miserable Russia's history had been in the preceding century, and felt
especially sorry for them. Also, if Germany and the USSR (only) had
gone to war, the Holocaust almost surely would still have taken place in
Eastern Europe: The Shoah just wouldn't
have destroyed the Jews west of the Rhine. Under the cover of total
war, Hitler's regime could do this, but he couldn't have done it during
peacetime.
I don’t believe Germany couldn't have
won after invading Russia, despite the citation of the Bulgarian ambassador
that has been made. That is, had Leningrad and Moscow had fallen, the two
leading cities of Russia, one the traditional and
restored capital, the other the former capital, Russian morale would
have sustained two crushing blows. Much of the success in waging war
concerns sustaining people's hopes for victory psychologically.
Furthermore, had Hitler's 1942 thrust to capture the Caucasus’ oil fields had
succeeded, which ultimately failed because of Stalingrad, the most decisive
single battle of the entire war (in this regard even Midway isn’t its equal), the
Red army likely wouldn't have had much oil to run its military machine
on. As the Germans experienced at the battle of the Bulge,
tanks aren't very useful when they run out of fuel. Just how
well-tapped were the Siberian oilfields in 1941? I doubt they would
have been enough, but I'm open to an empirical refutation by
someone with specific knowledge cranking out the numbers.
Would have Hitler have stopped after
invading and conquering Russia, and left the USA alone? Well, he wasn't
exactly rational, was he? If he believed the Aryan race (i.e., Germans)
should rule the world, would he have not only built nukes, but used the
technology developed for V-2 rockets launch them from ships to drop
them on American cities? Let's not forget all the super weapons that
Germany could have developed much more had they focused on them, such as jet
airplanes, rocket planes, the V-2, the beginning of nuclear bomb research,
submarines that didn't need to surface to get more oxygen, etc.
Also, had Britain lost the Battle of
Britain, Germany's transports could have received adequate air cover to
keep the Royal Navy from sinking them. Pearl Harbor, Taranto, and the
sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse all showed how vulnerable surface
ships without air protection were to enemy airpower. The Royal
Navy's surface superiority wouldn't have saved Britain
from its last (successful & hostile) invasion in 1066 by William
the Conqueror. (William III invaded England in 1688 also, it could be
argued, but he had an engraved invitation from much of the British
establishment). Britain barely won that battle, largely because of
German mistakes: The Luftwaffe didn't focus on one kind of target, such
as airbases, but kept changing target objectives. Then, in response
to a (small but embarrassing) British air raid on Berlin, Hitler and Goering went after London, which distracted them
from destroying British fighter airplanes and killing British
pilots. Britain could easily have been starved out by German submarines
(and indeed it was a close thing in 1942; Britain really wasn't safe until
the disastrous May 1943 sinkings of u-boats in the Battle of the
Atlantic). Churchill, interestingly enough, did plan on unleashing
poison gas on the Wehrmacht if the Germans tried to land in Britain.
Clearly, early major interventions
against Nazi Germany at either the Rhineland or Czechoslovakia could have saved
far more lives than Buchanan’s preference for Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia to
mutually destroy each other. Of course,
all war is sin and evil. I'm a good pacifist, who accepts a literal
interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:38-48). But if we're
playing these hypothetical what-ifs concerning the worst war in history, my
two scenarios are far better than Buchanan's main choice.